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As we Americans study the real1tiea of our troubled 
and disordered world, we fllUst recognize that conditions on this 
e rth are not what they were when we were children. Th• inter-
national situation following World War II bears veey little 
resemblance to th t following the first world war. Xn fact, 1\ 
has no precedence in history. 
We live in a changed world.. .Its aapect,e ar-, unfamiliar 
and, it must be admitted, somewhat fr1ght$ning. We cannot :solve 
the difficulties of today by leaning upon the precepts of the past. 
History can help us some, but not IDUCh, as we seek an lntelligent 
solution for the great twentieth century dilemma. 
We must cut new p tterns. New trails have to be blazecl. 
We must writ$ our own history according to the demands ot the hour. 
Amei-1cans n$ed not fear to face that necees:l.ty and to 
act upon it. Remember, Americans hav• always blazed new trails. 
It is our tradition. We have looked upon the wilderness without fear, 
and we have· &haped it to our need.a. We have made new designs in 
government, and found new ways to freedom. There is np need for 
Amer1eans to le.an t<>o heavily upon old w ye. Come what ay, Wt can 
afford full confidence that we will meet the challenge be:feire us •. 
'l'he challenge Qt which I epe k. m~ans e. somewhat l'"evolutionary 
change in our attitude toward national preparednese. We must lea:rn 
new way or thinking on that &Ubject, :for our traditional attitude• 
are .inadequate if we are to play our role in the world (irama of our 
time • 
Americans have alw~ys responded with wholehearted enthusiasm 
when an 1nternat1 onal c;r1si15 presented itself. Unde~ the tl:lreati, of 
aggression abroad. we have consistently and successfully ro~aed 
ourselves to the military nee ssitiea dictated by each crisis. Our 
record in hi story is made glorious. by our national unity and the 
rttsults we hav ~ chieved because of it, It ls also twe, however, 
th t when the cri$is has paesed, we have customarily sloughed otf 
the burden of ltlilitary dtmands and returned rather abruptly to the 
civ1li n world which we have learned to love eo dearly. That is 
only natural when you remember that our national characteristics 
are dominated by peaceful thinking. 
It is regr,ettable, but only too true• that the world today 
will :no longer lend it&$lf to such an attitude on the par't of 
American citizens. e ean no longer tace the military aituation on 
the basis ot meeting a crisis as it ariees and then t'etir1ng into 
peaceful pursuits without further thought ot war. W~ must create 
for ourselves o habit of penna.nent prepare(lness under wh.1ch we 
shall be ready for war at any tlme and anywhere in the world., 
It now app ar probable that. real, permanent world pe ce 
may be many decades in the future.. Since an anntstice was signed 
by Japan, we have seen little to indicate that genuine world peace 
is an immediate posslb1l1ty. In the last y ar or two, S.t would 
$eem that p~ace, has been J>U$hed further into the tutu.re. Dangerous 
tension aTe building up in any areas of the world, and ueually, 
ot course, 1n places where tb.e comntunista seek to spread their 
godless, barbaric ideologies. 
Thi being the ease,. we must examine the situation £rankly 
and we must realistically state our own role 1n eeting the conditions. 
To play th t role, we know now that we must have a plan for permanent 
preparedness which will last tor: ,many., many years•- as far as we can 
presently peer into the future .. It must be a plan tor psrt1al 
U'tobilization which can be turned into full JllObilizst1on almo•t :instantly. 
This is a new concept. We have never b~fore been .taeed 
With a need for partial mobilization. Heretofor ., it has always 
bean ttfee.st or famine." Fresh viewpoints and a frea,h approa(lh are 
not only desirable, but absolutely mandatory. 
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It ie to the shame 'Of our politicei.l leaders that the 
American people have not yet been handed a complete plan embodying 
such an approach,. It is not the fault of the peple themselvts 
that our stat of prep. redness is not adequate ~o meet the threat 
of communism. You and I know that when the American oitiien ie 
made fully aware of his role that he will fulfill it . 
Let us think tor a few minutes bout a plan for permanent 
preparedne.ss. What shall 1t i nclude? 
First ot all, we must plan on a global basis . The old 
expression "globaloney• invented by a w1tt;y femal• in Congress is 
no longer funny. The conception that national defense means , to 
Americans, a way to "pro'tEict theae shores" fro invasion 1s not 
sufficient £or these ti.mes. In the realistic vie:w. our frontiers 
are the edges of the iron curtain wherever 1 t ha.s fallen aero.as the 
world. 
It is discouraging, but it is a .fact th t the United States 
st nds alone as a bulwark ag inst oofillnunism. No other nation• • 
indeed, no group of nations- - is i:repared to meet that threat. Unless 
America stands squarely .against the Kremlin, the KrelTilin will prev_il . 
We cannot perm.it :iuch a catastrophe, and we will. not~ 
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Our plan, therefore, should provide .for preparedness 
on th p rt of ev ry nation which tod y st nd$ in the path o:t 
cotrununism. lf th t eans arm.lug them, then we must arm them just 
e.s we would our own citizens against invading armies. Am rica needs 
the help of all men who will turn thei.r hands against coinmunism, 
l'ilatever language they may apeak. 
Along with a aound plan £or world•wide eQntailllllent Qf 
communism• w~ need an adequate military pol1cy. a sound., firm, 
foreign policy. an eff ctive method or psychological warfare i'or 
d mocraey, and home front strengthened by internals eurity. It 
is th ae point tor permanent preparedness th t I want u to consider 
t this time. 
Th - pare.mount tnilitary issue ot th day ts the war in 
Korea. We should win that war and b& done with it. The t:ruce 
negottations have dt'agged out for o lQng that tb.e world finds it 
d1f'f1cult to det rltline to whom th victory belonge. Mean11hile , the 
coinmuniets are making use of the truce talks as a sounding board tor 
their prop ganda . The talk have .all the asp ct of a political 
m_eting r ther than a m111t ry one. 
It i $ not a pretty sight to see Anituti~Em generals tied up 
in apparently hopeless negotiations while our oldiers continue to 
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die every day in the fighting. I think it ts more in th American 
tradition to wi:.:1 the battles and then di etate tbe peace terms. 
· Perhaps it is too lat~ for tha.t now. Our obligations to our 
partners 1n the United Nations would not pend.ta c0tnplete reversal 
of policy at this point. eve;rthelees, I beli.eve that if' our 
ailitary leader$ in Korea ar-e given fr&e reign• tbey will bring 
the !igh:ting to clos on t rms acceptc. ble to the United Nations, 
Failing that, they most certainly can rene'W the campaign and force 
the enemy into -mil1ta.:ry submission. 
A determined policy i s needed 1n Korea. We have proof' 
that such a policy will pay of£ in the fact that it took tour months 
.to get Red China to agree to an arm.ietlc;:e line other than the 38th. 
The Chinese had insisted all .along that they would not tattle for 
anything else then tbe )8th pe.rallel., but they did. Without further 
dallying, n,d Chinn should be put on notice that the talks will be 
brought to _ u end lf:itbln a given period or the .fighting will be 
r$sumed. That is the ~nly realistic policy. 
Although we have lost some face in Korea., "We need not 
feel too badly. The principal United Nat.ions objective, that 0£ 
halting the aggreasor and pushing him Qut Qf South Ko~&; has be$n 
attained. During the negotiations, m1l1 tary aotion has been very 
limited. Since .June, 1950, we have had sol'J\ething ove.r 100,000 
casualties, and of the 76,000 wounded only l, 700 have died, This 
is high tribute t ·o the effect! veneS.s of our rn•dical servic*' in 
Korea, which has been outstanding. In World War I, eight out of 
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very 100 wounded. d.ied; in World Wat- II 1 £our out ot every 100; in 
the Korean war, two out or every 100. Of those who are woundtJd, 
50 csn go back into the line •. 
The Korean fighting has demonetrattd graphieally our need 
to build up a etirc;mg Air Fo:tee. We must look .forward to the eventual 
d. velopment or a force or 150 groups .. Military leader• now bell$Ve 
that the present 95~group aim is too low, and; 1ndeed1 Air Force 
Chief 0£,Staff G1:tnera1Vande~g has termed our present fore• a 
"ehoe-string11 Air Force in view of its glob l r eponsib1lit1es. The 
Strategic Aix:- Force is •till ;he wrld•s most po11erful military 
instrument. Nevertheless, the capacity of our Air Il'oroe to deliver 
the atomic bonib is not keeping pace with atomlo development. Meanwhile. 
the Russian are out .. produ.cing U.5 in aircraft, General Vandenberg 
h$& esti ated that it m.11 take the Yni ted States until 19SJ. to 
match the Ruesians in the a.1r . Nothing should btt allowed to et and 
in t ht! way of this aircraft building program. 
As to our ground forces, we are squarely aonfrOnted with 
two choices: e can maintain a large standing military eetabli~bment 
over a long period of years, or we can institute a program or 
universal military tr ining which will meke a large st nding army 
unn ces-=»ary. 
I incerely believe th t the tremendous expense of 
maintc.;.ining a large st"nding army over a long period would eventu lly 
bring our nation to bankruptcy. An insolvent nation cannot remain 
free nation for long. On the other hand, an intelligent system 
of universal military training would provide ab cklog of experienced 
men which would guarantee the n tional. defense at . comp r tively 
low cost. 
Although the Congress has again rejected UMT, I still 
believe we must eome to it_ as the only logical way to protect America. 
It is our best hope for workable plan of permanent preparedness. 
The young man reaching the ag of 1g years today stands in gr ve 
danger of h ving to risk his life in b ttle before he is 21. Th t 
1s the unfortunate fact. must not send him into battle untr ined--
where he ay perish in the early st ges of ght1ng bee u e he did 
not know the ropes. e have sent untrained men into b ttle any times 
in the past. Universal ilit ry training is the best possible way 
in which we can tr in our youth to protect them.selves and thereby 
protect our -00 try. 
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To back up this plan, we must continue to strengthen 
o-ur reserve components and to maintain them a.ta high degree of 
eff1eiency, thus utilizing the brains and experience of the past, 
he same careful attention and long-range planning ·must 
be given to the development of an adequate Navy, equipped w.t.th the 
finest ships and equipment. A $trong Navy may well become the means 
of carrying the war to othe:r shores rather than fighting it on our 
own soil. The saltte is true or the Marine Corps. 
The best plan for permanent preparednes, from the strictly 
tnilit ry viewpoint, entails powerful, alert striking forces from 
the Army, the N vy. the Marines, and the Air Gorps, b eked up by 
a deep well of r•s~rve strength in trained .-1 vilians. 
There are several t; hing.s we oan do to help 'br1ng about 
1;5uch an organization. One o:f the most important is further inttgration 
of the armed forces through the a.doptton of a single catalogue system. 
There is much evidence of waste and duplication in th$buying for th• 
Anned Forces. Competitive buying among the varl.ous units weakens the 
economic strength of our nation, with an estimated ex,tr cost of 
five billions a year. lt is not compatible with the philosophy of 
unification of the 8.l"med services, and it ju.st doesn't me.lee sense. 
fhe de-velopment of a.n adequate single catalogue ystem will cost much 
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money and great effort, but it will be worth it 1n time and me>ney 
saved and in inereased efficiency, and it should be undertaken with 
all possible speed. 
A problem of prime importance in developing permanent 
preparedness· is that of building a more adequate merchant marine. 
Our merchant marine has recently been on the downgrade. In 1947 
American ships carried 59% of our overseas trade. In J.950 thcey 
c~rried only 38;6 of 1~. Thie trend must be rtiversed 1£ we are to 
be prepared for w.ur. Full priority for steel and other materie.ls 
should be given to cur ship-building program. 
In a military way we can look back upon a year of fairly 
satisfactory progresih During the past year w have add.ed more than 
a. million men to our Armed Forces. We have added 28 wings to the 
Air Force. 1ncre~$ed our army divisions and returned 270 Navy vessels 
to active duty. We have reac~ed two billion dollars a month in 
military delive:riesand construction, more than three times that of' 
a year ago . While thet-e have been some cutbacks, the eiv11ian population 
has not yet .felt them very much. 
The g;oco~d gre t field of endeavor in working for permanent 
preparedness is our goal of a firm, clear ... cut foreign policy, We 
still huve not developed & for,eipl policy that Americans c~n underttand 
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and 'believe in, and tmit the Russiane and their satellites will 
respect. Ther\3 io still some evidence 'that we are going down the 
cangerous road of ~p~asement. 
At no time since the Korean war began has there been 
greater need f.or a .f'irm pol1cy in Asia . The entire East i s a tinderbox 
today. The French have their hands full in Indo-Ghina. If the Reds 
move in there. Indo-China might fall, Should that happen, tbe Red 
tide in Burma, Thailand, and a)ara might engulf the governments 
of those lands, and the ltlhole of Southee:st Asia would be in Red. bands. 
Jome foreign affairs experts believe this dangerous situation is 
very much like that existing 'With tbe Japan•se be.fore Ptar-1 Barbor. 
The time is late, but it is never too late to adopt a firm policy 
in the East , 
We must find ways of showing the Russians that we are 
determined to win world peace, but t.'1. .. t we realize our effort muet 
be be.eked up by a nation fully prepared to fight if necessary. Too 
often the Russians have succeeded in making our diplomata lose sight 
of their long~range objectives, by harping on minor differences of 
the moment . 
In purauing this policy• we must take .full advanta.g of 
thee.aa1stance ottered by friendly nations. Such p&aples mutt be 
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brought into the fold of united action against comlllunism. One 
good illustration is the friendly attitude or Turkey• where we 
have built air !ields,. Turkey is strongly anti-comuniat. Her 
army numbers 400,000,all good fighters. Another illustration 1.$ 
Spain, whose port& the United 3tatee Sixth Fle~t r•oently visited 
for the first tim.e· since 19,36. Spain should be brought tnto the 
fo1d. 
\\!'bile aiding fritmUy countries. we· must also tak·e ttrm 
steps to withhold any kind ()f aseiet~nee from communist-nalnded 
nation:t. ln. some cases, Amen.can shipments of gocds have been 
finding their way into Iron Curtain countries. Such shipments must 
Finally, our foreign p9.licy should 1nclud.e continued 
full support of the United Nations . Thie organ1r,at1on is not a wo~ld 
govermnent, and not ev~n a sta~ toward one, Qs its relation~hips 
are With aover-•1gn states and. it is restrsicted .from 1nvolvingU.:selt 
with internal at.fairs.. I fimly believe. that the United Nations i.s 
tbe greatest step ever taken by mankind toward the outlawing of war.. 
It has proved ita effectiveness in Korea, in Greece, and in other 
parts 0£ the world, and we must continue to bolster it with our full 
participation. 
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"J.'he third point in our' permanent preparedness effort 
should be n more ef'fecti ve psychological warfJii.re p'.rogram. Thi -
p~gram, if' it itJ handled 1n a realistic a.nd iri.t~lllgent W"''Y, can 
help to spread the concepts of democracy which are so vital in 
combating coi:mm.utism. At this time our psychological program is too 
weak tobe ef£ective. Our e11emies know thist and they are taking 
ad.vantage of it. Russia is spending $40.000,000 a yee.r !or pamphlets 
alone. Other communi$t count:ries are spending from a hundred to six 
hundred million dollars a year on propaganda. The communist 
organization in France alone has an annual budget ol 150,000,000. 
We nave :recently organized a Psychological .Strategy Board 
for the purpose of working out long-range strategy. · This!$ a step 
in the right d.irection; for it unifies the efforts of the St.ate 
Department, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency. 
We must a,ll democracy througnout the world, for it is the 
best answer to communism. 
Our final aim in laying down a plan for permanent preparedness 
should be th~ maintenance 0£ a unified home fr.ont backed by a .sound 
nation~l econo~y. 
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To accomplish this purpose• non-eaaent1al. :~on-deiens& 
e penditures must be kept to an absolute minimum. This year the 
Congress we$ ,u1ked to appropriate e1gbty ... f1ve billion dollars. 
presumably becs.u~e of j.ncriased rnilit~y spending. However1 finanei·al 
experts tell ~ that the bill al.so represent$ 8Jl iner~as~ of ten 
billions tor non-d.e.fense purpos-es. That is. a dangerous request 1n 
these tiees. We are ;rapi ly approaching the day wbtn we Will be 
apending ourselves out ot businees . Senator Harry F. Byrd, of 
Virgini a, one of the nation's greatest experts in fiscal policy. 
says the finE;1n~ial peril confronting us is s great az, the tlu-eat of 
war itself. Be b&lievatl that from Six to eight billions in non-
ess,ntial spend.i11g can be. eliminated.; and his effort to eliminate 
it should have the eupport ot all loyal Americana .• 
Along with a sound fiscal Policy, we must have e.11 .... out 
indust.rial p.roduet1on tor our defense needs, carrying with it priority 
allocations of critical materials strictly aligned with the prepartd• 
ness program. Our vast industrial pot,ential, which meant. eo mu.ch 
in World War II, muet be utilized to the gl'"f!atest Possible e:xtent. 
Already, industry is gearing itself tor a long-range 
program to meet rn:ll:it ry requirements. The milit ry consumed 12% of 
the gross national product l ast year, and nll probably consume 1~ 
of the national product in 1952# which means a $ii•able gtiin. At 
ind . try expands to meet the reqairements, the advi.aability ot 
Qecentralization should always be kept in mind; not only from the 
"5tandpoint 0£ possible attack from the air, but to equaltze the 
burden of production throughout trie country. 
ii thin industry and ine;ide our gov~rnment ci.rol$s • we 
must be eternally vigilant in keepin down the threat of communist 
infiltration. In r•ce11t years we have made some etrides in exposing 
the communists who have sometimes penetrated to th$ most e~cret 
pl· ces of our national lif'e. Th.is effort must continue unabated, 
e-lse we may wake up one day to. find alien hande at our ven vitals. 
Finally, in building our design £or internal s curity1 
we must develop an a.dequ.ate pn:,g,ram of' c::L'Vilinn defense for critical 
a:reas. Needl · ea to say,. this e.ff"ort may vary con!fiderably from one 
community to another. Some communities may .feel that no et.fort at 
all is needed. Others, finding themselves locattd in the vicinity 
of vulne.rable Jtlilitary install tions or vast industrial developments. 
ahould. work out an integr-ated plan so that every cttizen will know 
what to do nd ho to do it in the event 0£ an enemy attack. 
We cannot overlook tht! PQSeibility or nn stotnic attack, 
and eYen a succ.ess.fu.l one. The Ch1ef of our Ai:r Force has said that 
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at lea.st 70% or an ~ttacking force could penet:r te our ail'" deten$es . 
Th t mt>an$ at·omic bombs could be dropped ·On our eities in spite of 
the efforts of' our air· screen. Knowing this r aet., Amer! cans cannot 
fail to ;repare them.selves. 
There we have it•- a four-pronged plan tor permanent 
peeparednes$, an ad~quate military e ta.blishment; a firm foreign 
policy; an effectivepsyehologieal warfare program; and a sound 
11ational eeon9my me.king tor internal security. 
We can accomplish this aim Without 'becoming a militartetio 
nation. There is no need to fear that the merican citizen, 'Who 
io a nian of peaceful _pureui.ts. \'fill be converted in'ti() an aggressive 
military type . Americ~..ns are too straight-forward in their thinking 
to allow sueh a thing to come about . 
It 1s, after all, a responsibility of the Arttertcan eit.izen. 
Knowing him as l believe l do, I have every f;i.ith in his ability to 
dt!end h1a country and to stop the onslaught of c01m11unism whetiever 
h& meets it th~oughout the world • 
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